











Title of Thesis: THE ROLE OF GOSSIP IN THE 
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 
  
 Xinyue Pan, Master of Science, 2021 
  
Thesis Directed By: Professor, Michele Gelfand, Department of 
Psychology 




The prevalence of cooperation in human societies is astonishing. Scholars from many 
disciplines have been sought to understand why it evolves. Some studies have 
indicated that gossip may play an important role in the evolution of cooperation. 
However, there has yet to be a systematic attempt to test this hypothesis directly. In 
this thesis, I developed an evolutionary game theoretic model and examined the role 
of gossip in the evolution of cooperation as well as the mechanism of the evolution of 
gossipers. I found that gossip increases reputation accessibility and makes the 
utilization of reputation information effective and necessary. The utilization of 
reputation information not only leads to more cooperation but also motivates 
individuals to manage their reputation by cooperating more with gossipers. As a 
result, gossipers gain an advantage over non-gossipers, and this leads to the evolution 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Cooperation occurs when an individual carries out an action that is costly to 
perform, but benefits other individuals (West et al., 2007). The prevalence of 
cooperation in human societies is astonishing (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Sachs et al., 
2004), and scholars from many disciplines have been sought to understand the puzzle 
of why it evolves (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Hamilton, 1964; Nowak, 2006; Sachs 
et al., 2004; West et al., 2007). Some studies have indicated that gossip may play an 
important role in the evolution of cooperation (Dunbar, 1997; 2004; Enquist & 
Leimar, 1993; Foster, 2004; Piazza & Bering, 2007; Wu et al., 2016). However, there 
has yet to be a systematic attempt to test this hypothesis directly. In this thesis, I 
developed an agent-based model to explore the role of gossip in the evolution of 
cooperation as well as how gossiping behavior and cooperation co-evolve in the 
population. 
In what follows, I first review previous work on the mechanisms for the 
evolution of cooperation. I focused on the indirect reciprocity mechanism, which 
depends greatly on the establishment and use of reputation (Nowak, 2006; Nowak & 
Sigmund, 1998b). Next, I discuss previous work on the role of gossip in cooperation. 
Particularly, I focus on two of the functions of gossip that are important for indirect 
reciprocity—1) the information function of gossip, in which gossip promotes the 
spread of reputation information, and 2) the influence function of gossip, in which 
people behave more altruistically under the threat of gossip (Foster, 2004). The 





discussed. To fulfill the gaps, I then present an agent-based model with an 
evolutionary game theoretic framework. I examine how the existence of gossip 
promotes the evolution of cooperation through the two functions. Moreover, I show 
how gossipers co-evolve with cooperation as a result of the two functions. Finally, I 
discuss the contributions, limitations and future directions for this thesis. 
1.2 The Evolution of Cooperation 
From hunter-gatherers to modern societies, human societies are characterized 
with mass cooperation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Sachs et al., 2004). Cooperation 
occurs when an individual carries out a behavior that is costly to perform, but benefits 
other individuals (West et al., 2007). Since cooperation is not the “rational” behavior 
for interest pursuers (Amadae, 2015), researchers have long been interested in 
understanding why cooperation evolves in human societies (Axelrod & Hamilton, 
1981; Hamilton, 1964; Nowak, 2006; Sachs et al., 2004; West et al., 2006). 
Several mechanisms were identified for the evolution of cooperation (Nowak, 
2006), among which a well-studied one is indirect reciprocity (Fu et al., 2008; Nowak 
& Sigmund, 1998b; Swakman et al., 2015). Indirect reciprocity is the mechanism in 
which one gains reputation from altruistic behaviors, which will get rewarded by 
receiving help from others in the future (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b). As Nowak 
(2006) wrote, “helping someone establishes a good reputation, which will be 
rewarded by others; when deciding how to act, we take into account the possible 
consequences for our reputation” (p. 1561). 
Much work, both empirically and theoretically, has been done on how 





people actively seek reputation information and use the information to guide their 
cooperative decisions (Seinen & Schram, 2001; Swakman et al., 2015). Likewise, 
evolutionary models showed that with the help of reputation, individuals can initialize 
cooperation even in a society with many unconditional defectors. In the meantime, 
individuals also evolve to behave discriminatively toward others with good vs. bad 
reputations (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a). Recent research has extended these findings 
by introducing more complex behaviors (e.g., enabling players to shift interaction 
partners; Fu et al., 2008), applying higher-order social norms (e.g., labeling people as 
good or bad according to different standards; Santos et al., 2018), and involving 
rewards and punishments (Hauert, 2010). Altogether, these studies showed that 
reputation is essential for the evolution of cooperation and individuals actively seek 
and utilize reputation information to guide their cooperation decisions. 
1.3 The Functions of Gossip in Cooperation 
Reputation information is managed in the population largely through a social 
behavior—gossip (Dunbar, 1997; 2004). Gossip has a variety of definitions across 
disciplines. In this thesis, I define it as the exchange of personal information given in 
an evaluative way about absent third parties (Foster, 2004). Gossip serves many 
social functions, such as entertaining, facilitating friendship and social networks, etc. 
(Foster, 2004; Shaw et al., 2011). However, the key roles that gossip plays in the 
reputation system is through two pathways: the information function and the 
influence function, as elaborated below (Foster, 2004; Paine, 1967). 
The information function emphasizes the role of gossip as an efficient and, at 





gossip, people share information about each other’s cooperation reputation so that 
people can use this information to guide their decisions in social interactions. The 
content of gossip is admittedly not exclusively about reputation, but as an evaluative 
talk regarding a third party, especially when direct interaction and/or observation are 
not always viable, gossip increases the accessibility of each other’s reputation. 
According to Nowak (2006), indirect reciprocity through reputation can only promote 
cooperation when the reputation information is prevalent enough. This indicates that 
gossip, by making reputation information more prevalent, can benefit the evolution of 
cooperation through indirect reciprocity. 
The influence function describes the role that gossip plays in motivating 
people to alter their behavior in order to manage their reputation. When people feel 
that their behavior can be potentially gossiped with identifiable information, 
reputational concerns motivate them to behave in a more cooperative way (Piazza & 
Bering, 2008; Wu et al., 2019).  
Numerous empirical studies have examined the two functions of gossip. With 
respect to the information function, in Sommerfeld et al. (2007), participants played a 
cooperation game and were allowed to send short sentences about others (i.e., gossip) 
to each other. Results showed that gossip transmitted reputation information 
successfully and people cooperated more with positively reputed others. With respect 
to the influence function, Piazza and Bering (2008) found that participants who were 
told that their behavior would be disclosed to a third party were more cooperative 
than participants who did not face the threat of gossip. Feinberg et al. (2012) did four 





some personal cost. Moreover, those who were low on prosociality at ordinary times 
behaved more altruistically when their reputation mattered. For general effects of 
gossip, Wu et al. (2016) found that the option to gossip increased cooperation in the 
group. More importantly, the initial option to gossip made people more trusting and 
trustworthy in the subsequent game even when gossip was no longer possible. 
1.4 Limitations of Previous Research 
Though these experiments have important theoretical implications, they face 
some challenges and limitations. First, to understand the evolution of cooperation on 
the population level, it is difficult to recruit a large network of population and let 
them interact in real time. Experiments based on small groups, however, may fail to 
capture some important characteristics of the population, such as network structures 
and mobility. 
Second, though these laboratory studies are usually successful in manipulating 
whether people gossip and how much they gossip, there are some variables that are 
difficult to directly manipulate on human participants, such as how much people trust 
a piece of gossip, how much they are influenced by gossip, etc. Thus, it is difficult to 
examine how the aforementioned factors moderate the role of gossip in cooperation. 
Finally, and most importantly, though empirical studies can capture the 
current norms and values in human societies, they don’t explain why gossiping 
behavior and reputation concerns evolved in the first place. Though gossip can bring 
information to and thus promote cooperation in the population, from an individual’s 
perspective, gossiping is not entirely uncostly. It remains unknown, from an 





evolution of reputation concerns under the threat of gossip is also a puzzle. 
Cooperating is costly and, at times, exposes oneself under the risk of being exploited 
by free-riders. Why are people motivated to leave a good reputation in gossip even at 
the risk of losing the present benefit? Furthermore, if gossip cannot transmit 
reputation information effectively, will people still behave cooperatively under the 
threat of gossip? 
Given the limitations of empirical studies, a complementary method is 
computational modeling. Indeed, computational models have been widely used to 
study the mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation (Nowak, 2006; 2012), 
including the role of reputation in indirect reciprocity (e.g., Mohtashemi & Mui, 
2003; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a; Ohtsuki et al., 2015; see Giardini & Wittek, 2019, 
for a recent review). For example, in the seminal work of Nowak and Sigmund 
(1998a), a model was built in which individuals gained “image scores” (i.e., positivity 
of reputation) by cooperating with others. Individuals could choose from three 
strategies: 1) “unconditional cooperators” who always cooperate, 2) “unconditional 
defectors” who never cooperate, and 3) “discriminators” who cooperate only when 
the interaction partner’s “image score” is high enough. They let virtual individuals 
with different strategies interact with each other and gain payoffs from the 
interactions. Individuals with higher payoffs reproduced more and individuals with 
lower payoffs were crowed out. Simulation results showed that a substantial 
proportion of individuals evolved to be “discriminators” and the existence of the 
reputation system could initialize cooperation even in a society with many defectors. 





private interactions (Ohtsuki et al., 2015). Specifically, they examined the evolution 
of “honest” individuals who cooperate both in public and in private and the evolution 
of “hypocritical” individuals who cooperate only in public, when many others are 
watching. By letting individuals with different strategies interact and compete 
through an evolutionary process, they found that cooperating in private interactions 
was suppressed if the observability was low and if private interactions were rare. The 
result indicated that the potential for one’s reputation to be known to public 
influences people’s cooperation decisions. 
Though these models have showed the importance of reputation in the 
evolution of cooperation, they did not examine the role of gossip directly. In fact, 
fewer models have directly incorporated the process of gossiping. One of the 
exceptions is Enquist and Leimar (1993). They set up a model where individuals 
select partners based on reputation information. Reputation information is exchanged 
through gossip when individuals meet. Through a mathematical model with a term 
which represented the spread of gossip, they found that gossip promoted cooperation. 
There are also some agent-based models on the effects of gossip. One of the 
advantages of agent-based models is that they can implement the interactions between 
specific gossipers, listeners, and/or targets, instead of having to implement the global 
effects of gossip on the population level as in mathematical models. This is 
particularly helpful for simulating the spread of gossip in a social network and/or 
controlling the content of gossip. For example, Giardini and Vilone (2016) built an 
agent-based model where individuals play public goods games in groups. Groups 





based on both direct observation and gossip. They found that when the quantity of 
gossip was large enough, gossip supported cooperation (see Giardini et al., 2014, for 
a similar model). 
All the models above showed how gossip increases the accessibility of 
reputation and thus promotes the evolution of cooperation—the information function 
of gossip. However, to my knowledge, there is not yet a computational model that has 
examined the influence function of gossip. One of the most relevant models is 
Ohtsuki et al. (2015), which indicated that people may evolve to cooperate only in 
public but not in private under certain circumstances, depending on how likely their 
reputation in private will be known by others. This suggests that the potential to 
gossip may motivate people to cooperate more in private. However, the model of 
Ohtsuki et al. (2015) did not incorporate the process of gossiping directly, leaving this 
inference untested. 
Moreover, none of these models examined the evolution of gossipers. Even 
given the information and influence functions of gossip, it remains unclear why 
gossipers evolved in the first place. First of all, to gossip is to voluntarily share one’s 
information resource with others. Though gossiping may be beneficial for the group, 
individuals still face the temptation to keep the information to themselves, so that 
they can maintain an “information advantage” over others. Moreover, gossiping is not 
necessarily uncostly. Like other prosocial behaviors, it is a puzzle why one is willing 
to share information with others even at a cost. Furthermore, it remains unclear 
whether the evolution of gossipers is a consequence of its information and/or 





1.5 Goals of This Thesis 
To fulfill these gaps, this thesis implemented an agent-based model based on 
an evolutionary game theoretic (EGT) framework. Evolutionary game theory 
integrates theories from evolutionary biology and game theory (Hofbauer & 
Sigmund, 2003). As elaborated in the Method section, the logic of an EGT model is 
to put virtual individuals with different behavioral preferences in a certain context and 
let them interact. As in the natural selection in biology, individuals who perform well 
are more likely to survive and reproduce while individuals who do not perform well 
are likely to be wiped out. Overtime, an EGT model shows how adaptive the 
behaviors are in a certain context (Pan et al., in press). EGT models are particularly 
helpful for studying the emergence of behaviors from an evolutionary perspective and 
have been widely used to study the evolution of cooperation (Axelrod & Hamilton, 
1981; Nowak, 2006), warfare (Choi and Bowles, 2007), cultural tightness (Roos et 
al., 2015), honor culture (Nowak et al., 2016), etc. 
In this thesis, I simulated a population where individuals interact with each 
other and decide whether to cooperate. Individuals can also talk to each other and 
share their beliefs of others’ reputation if they are gossipers. In the population, each 
individual’s trait consists of two dimensions—a gossiping trait and a cooperation 
trait. For the gossiping part, they can either be a gossiper or a non-gossiper. For the 
cooperation part, there are three kinds of individuals: 1) individuals unaffected by 
gossip as their cooperation behaviors are insensitive to reputation information (i.e., 
unconditional individuals), 2) individuals susceptible to the information function of 





reputation (i.e., reputation sensitive individuals), and 3) individuals susceptible to the 
influence function of gossip as their cooperation behaviors are conditional on whether 
there is a threat of gossip (i.e., gossiper sensitive individuals). By implementing all 
the possible combinations of these traits to the individuals, I observed the 
evolutionary trajectory of different behaviors and, thus, examined which behaviors 
are evolutionarily adaptive. Specifically, this thesis was aimed to achieve the 
following goals: 
1. To build an integrated agent-based model which incorporates the processes of 
gossip spread, incorporates both the information and the influence functions 
of gossip, and is able to study the evolution of gossipers as well as the co-
evolution of gossipers and cooperation; 
2. To replicate the information function of gossip with this new model; 
specifically, to test whether a substantial proportion of individuals evolve to 
be reputation sensitive, whether increased accessibility of reputation 
information promotes cooperation, as well as whether gossiping boosts 
reputation accessibility, and thus benefits cooperation; 
3. To test the influence function of gossip; specifically, to test whether a 
substantial proportion of individuals evolve to be gossiper sensitive and 
cooperate under the threat of gossip;  
4. To study the mechanisms of the evolution of gossipers; specifically, to 
examine under what conditions gossipers evolve; 
5. To build a new framework of how gossipers and cooperation co-evolve, 





Chapter 2: Methods 
2.1 Introduction to EGT Framework 
An agent-based EGT model was used for this thesis. In a typical agent-based 
EGT model, there is a population of virtual individuals embedded in a social network, 
each of which has a strategy. Based on their strategies, individuals interact with their 
neighbors in the network, gain the interaction consequences, and each gets a payoff, 
which represents their evolutionary fitness—the extent to which an individual and 
their strategy can successfully reproduce (Sigmund & Nowak, 1999). In the context 
of human behavior, reproduction may be interpreted as the processes of cultural 
transmission, either within or across generations (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; 
Harley, 1981). As with selection in biological evolution, strategies related to higher 
fitness are more likely to be reproduced. Accordingly, the proportions of the high-
fitness strategies increase while the proportions of the low-fitness strategies decrease 
across time. Thus, by allowing agents to interact and update their strategies 
repeatedly, an EGT model can show the change of the proportions of different 







Figure 1 EGT Framework for Studying the Evolution of Behaviors 
 
Note. From “Societal Threat and Cultural Variation in the Strength of Social Norms: 
An Evolutionary Basis,” by P. Roos, M. Gelfand, D. Nau, and J. Lun, 2015, 







2.2 Agents’ Strategies 
In my model, each agent’s strategy consists of two parts—a gossiping strategy 
and a cooperation strategy. There are two possible gossiping strategies: gossipers 
(AG) who always gossip in a conversation and non-gossipers (AN) who never gossip. 
Agents’ gossiping strategies are transparent—every agent knows whether everyone 
else is a gossiper or non-gossiper. 
An agent’s cooperation strategy decides under what circumstances they 
cooperate in the interactions. There are six possible cooperation strategies, which can 
be defined into three categories. The first category is unconditional strategies. Agents 
with unconditional strategies conduct the same behavior to everyone. There are two 
strategies in this category:  unconditional cooperators (AC) who always cooperate 
and unconditional defectors (AD) who always defect. AC and AD are the most basic 
strategies that have been widely used in models of cooperation (e.g., Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981). The second category is reputation sensitive strategies. Agents of 
this category take their interaction partners’ cooperation reputation into consideration 
and make cooperation decisions accordingly. There are two strategies in this 
category: Virtuous agents (CC) use the reputation information to protect themselves 
from defectors. They only defect when they believe that their interaction partner will 
defect with them. Exploitive agents (CD), however, use the reputation information to 
exploit others. They only cooperate when they believe that their interaction partner is 
a reputation sensitive agent. Otherwise, they will defect and exploit their interaction 
partner. The implementation of these two strategies was inspired by the reputation 





category is gossiper sensitive strategies. Agents with these strategies are concerned 
about their reputation in gossip. Thus, they will behave differently when interacting 
with gossipers vs. non-gossipers. There are also two strategies in this category: 
Hypocritical agents (GC) defect with non-gossipers but cooperate with gossipers and 
thus will leave a good reputation in gossip. Reverse-hypocritical agents (GD), 
however, cooperate with non-gossipers but defect with gossipers and thus 
intentionally ruin their own reputations in gossip. The two gossiper sensitive 
strategies were implemented to enable the influence function of gossip. Note that GD 
should be unusual in real life, but I added it to make the model “neutral.” That way, 
the model was not set-up to benefit gossipers. Agents’ cooperation strategies are not 
transparent to everyone. An agent may learn about another agent’s cooperation 
strategy through direct interactions or gossip, as elaborate below. A summary of the 
strategies can be found in Table 1. An agent may have any combinations of a 
gossiping and a cooperation strategy. Thus, there are 2 * 6 = 12 possible 






Table 1 Summary of Gossiping and Cooperation Strategies 
Strategy Description 
Gossip strategy 
      Gossiper (AG) Always gossip 
      Non-gossiper (AN) Never gossip 
Cooperation strategy 
Unconditional  
      Unconditional cooperator (AC) Always cooperate 
      Unconditional defector (AD) Always defect 
Reputation sensitive  
      Virtuous (CC) Only defect when believing the partner will 
defect, otherwise cooperate 
      Exploitive (CD) Only cooperate when believing the partner 
is reputation sensitive, otherwise defect 
Gossiper sensitive  
      Hypocritical (GC) Cooperate only to gossipers 







2.3 Agents’ “Brains” 
In addition to strategies, each agent also has a “brain” that stores their belief 
about every other agent’s strategy. This set-up differs from previous studies that 
treated reputation as a “rating” which is pubic for everyone (Nowak & Sigmund, 
1998a; Santos et al., 2018). Instead, this model assumes that reputation is stored in 
individuals’ minds. Everyone has a unique belief of everyone else’s strategy based on 
their previous interactions with the target and/or what they have heard about the 
target. An agent’s belief of each other agent’s strategy can be represented by a 
probability table as shown in Figure 2. The probability table shows the probability of 
the target being of each cooperation strategy, in the believer’s mind. This is consistent 
with the theory of naive probability in psychology in which people construct mental 
models of what is true in the various possibilities (Johnson-Laird et al., 1999). 
The believer also has an overall belief of the target, which is weighted 
sampled from the probability table. In addition, the believer has a confidence level of 
their belief, which is the maximum value in the probability table. The awareness of 
one’s confidence is consistent with the psychological theory of metacognition 
(Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2008). When the believer interacts with the target, the 
believer treats the target as if the target is of the believed strategy. If the believer 
gossips, the believer tells others that the target is of their believed type as well as the 
confidence level related to that belief. When an agent has no information about 
another agent (i.e., when an agent has not interacted with or heard of another agent 
yet), the probability table is a flat distribution where the probability of being any type 





overall belief is randomly selected from all the possible types. However, the 
distribution will become uneven as agents directly interact and/or hear about each 
other through gossip, which will be elaborated below. 
 
Figure 2 Agents’ “Brains” 
 
Notes. Each agent has a belief of every other agent’s strategy. The belief is 
represented by a probability table. In this example, Agent1 believes that Agent2 has a 
probability of 0.05 to be an unconditional cooperator (AC), a probability of 0.5 to be 
an unconditional defector (AD), etc. Agent1 also has an overall belief of Agent2, 
which is weighted sampled from the probability table. An agent’s confidence about 
their overall belief is the maximum value in the probability table. In this example, a 
virtuous (CD) is sampled as the overall belief. The confidence of this belief is 0.5. 
Agent1 will treat Agent2 as an CD when they interact in a cooperation game. If 






2.4 Cooperation Phase 
2.4.1 Gain Payoffs 
In the cooperation phase, agents play pairwise cooperation games. An agent 
decides whether to cooperate based on their own cooperation strategy and their 
overall belief of their partner’s strategy, as shown in Table 2. As in Nowak (2006), if 
an agent chooses to cooperate, they pay a cost, c, for the partner to receive a larger 
benefit, b. If an agent chooses to defect, they pay no cost and the partner receives 
nothing. Same as Roos et al. (2015), b = 3 and c = 1. The payoff matrix for a pairwise 







Table 2 Cooperation Behavior When Different Strategies Encounter 
 
ACAG ADAG CCAG CDAG GCAG GDAG ACAN ADAN CCAN CDAN GCAN 
 
GDAN 
ACAG C C C C C C C C C C C C 
ADAG D D D D D D D D D D D D 
CCAG C D C C C D C D C C C D 
CDAG D D C C D D D D C C D D 
GCAG C C C C C C D D D D D D 
GDAG D D D D D D C C C C C C 
ACAN C C C C C C C C C C C C 
ADAN D D D D D D D D D D D D 
CCAN C D C C D C C D C C D C 
CDAN D D C C D D D D C C D D 
GCAN C C C C C C D D D D D D 
GDAN D D D D D D C C C C C C 
Note. In the four-letter strategy codes, the first two digits represent one’s cooperation 
strategy and the last two digits represent one’s gossip strategy. Rows represent 
decision-makers’ strategies; columns represent the partners’ strategies in the decision-
makers’ overall belief. In the behavior matrix, “C” represents “to cooperate” and “D” 
represents “to defect.” Unconditional cooperators (AC) always cooperate. 
Unconditional defectors (AD) always defect. Virtuous agents (CC) only defect when 
they believe that their partner will defect. Thus, CC will defect with AD. If the CC is 
a gossiper (AG), they will also defect with reverse-hypocritical agents (GD) because 
GDs defect with gossipers. However, if the CC is a non-gossiper (AN), they will 
defect with hypocritical agents (GC) because GCs defect with non-gossipers. 
Exploitive agents (CD) only cooperate with reputation sensitive agents. Thus, a CD 
will only cooperate with CCs or CDs. A GC cooperates only with AGs and a GD 










Table 3 Payoff Matrix for a Pairwise Cooperation Game 
 The action of AgentY 
 Cooperate Defect 
The action of AgentX   
Cooperate (X: 2, Y:  2) (X: -1, Y: 3) 
Defect (X: 3, Y: -1) (X:  0, Y: 0) 






2.4.2 Manifest Strategies 
During the interactions, agents also manifest their cooperation strategies to 
their interaction partners. For unconditional cooperators (AC), unconditional 
defectors (AD), virtuous agents (CC), and exploitive agents (CD), they manifest their 
real strategies. For hypocritical agents (GC) and reverse-hypocritical agents (GD), 
they will behave differently in front of gossipers vs. non-gossipers and manipulate a 
different strategy in front of gossipers. Specifically, when they interact with a 
gossiper, a GC will manifest to be a CC while a GD will manifest to be an AD. GCs 
and GDs will manifest their real strategies in front of non-gossipers, because there is 
no motivation to fake without the threat of gossip. Alternative choices of what a GC 
manifests to be were explored in robustness tests. 
If an agent X manifests a certain strategy, in their interaction partner Y’s 
mind, the probability of X being of that strategy will be increased by dirW (0 < dirW 
< 1), with a maximum of 1. dirW indicates the amount of information that an 
individual gains about their partner from one direct interaction. As a consequence, the 
probability of other strategies will be decreased proportionally for the table to sum to 
1 (see Figure 3). After changing the probability table, Y will also update their overall 
belief and confidence, based on the rules in Figure 2. In the default model, dirW was 






Figure 3 Change of Probability Table 
 
Note. The first table shows the original probability table. In the second table, the 
probability of AC was increased by 0.5. As a result, the probability of other strategies 







2.5 Conversation Phase 
In the conversation phase, agents have pairwise conversations. In each 
conversation, there is a speaker and a listener. If the speaker is a gossiper (AG), the 
speaker will gossip to the listener regarding targetN = 2 targets. The targets are 
randomly selected from the common neighbors of the speaker and the listener. If 
there are 2 or less common neighbors, all the common neighbors will be selected as 
targets, if any. In the default model, we did not consider the cost of gossip based on 
the assumption that the effort spent on gossiping is neglectable compared with the 
effort needed for a cooperative behavior. However, in robustness tests, we explored 
the situations when gossip is costly. If gossip is costly, each time when an agent 
gossips about a target, they pay a gossip cost, gCost.  
When X gossips to Y about Z, X tells Y about X’s overall belief of Z as well 
as the confidence of it. Research has shown that people are biased to learn from 
others perceived as more confident (Birch et al., 2010; Jaswal & Malone, 2007). 
Thus, when Y hears about X’s belief of Z, a weight will be given to that piece of 
gossip based on the confidence of X, as shown in Equation (1). The parameter bias ≥ 
0 controls the extent to which people are biased toward more confident gossip. When 
bias = 0, the weight is always 1, in which case people value any gossip equally. As 
bias becomes larger, people give much higher weight to more confident gossip while 
lower weight to unconfident gossip, as shown in Figure 4. The default value of bias 
was set as 5. A sufficiently high bias is essential for agents to form accurate belief of 
each other through gossip, as elaborated in the Results section.  














Next, Y updates the probability table of Z based on the gossip from X. 
Specifically, if X tells Y that Z has a certain strategy (i.e., X’s overall belief of Z), in 
Y’s probability table of Z, the probability of that strategy will be increased by indirW 
× weight, following the same rule as in Figure 3. The parameter 0 < indirW < 1 
controls the maximum influence of gossip. The larger indirW is, the more that people 
tend to change their belief based on what they hear from gossip. By default, indirW = 
0.5, though other values were also explored. After changing the probability table, Y 
also updates their overall belief and confidence of Z as explained above. 
2.6 Network Structures 
2.6.1 Static Structures 
In each simulation, there are N = 200 agents embedded in a social network. In 
the default model, a small-world network with an average degree of swK = 20 is used. 
Small world networks have been widely used to resemble connections in real-world 
(Milgram, 1967; Weeden & Cornwell, 2020). The small-world network is generalized 
with the algorithm in Watts and Strogatz (1998) using the “watts_strogatz_grah()” 
function in NetworkX in Python. This method first creates a ring over N = 200 nodes. 
Then each node in the ring is connected with its swK = 20 nearest neighbors. Then 
shortcuts are created by replacing some edges as follows: for each edge u-v in the 
network, with a probability swP = 0.5, replace it with a new edge u-w with uniformly 
random choice of existing node w (Hagberg et al., 2008). An illustration of the 
network structure can be found in Figure S1. Other network structures, including 
small world networks with different levels of connection and random networks, were 






In the default model, the network structure is fixed. In other words, the 
mobility of the population, m = 0 by default. However, we also explored the effects of 
network mobility in further analyses. If an agent moves, they randomly cut cutP = 
90% of their connections and randomly selected an agent in the population as a 
contact person. Next, they build a connection to the contact person. If the contact 
person has k neighbors at the moment, the relocated agent will randomly select k × 
buildP – 1 agents from these neighbors and build connections with them, where 
buildP = 90% by default. This process mimics the processes where when someone 
moves, they cut some old connections and builds new connections with the destiny 
neighborhood. 
2.7 Simulation Phases 
To initialize each simulation, N = 200 agents with random cooperation and 
gossiping strategies are embedded in a social network. Each agent has an evenly 
distributed probability table and a randomly selected overall belief for every other 
agent. Then the simulation repeats iterations consisting of the following three steps: 
1) cooperation phase, 2) conversation phase, and 3) strategy updating phase. 
2.7.1 Cooperation Phase 
At the beginning of each iteration, N × intF agents are randomly selected1 to 
play a cooperation game with a randomly selected neighbor. intF indicates the 
frequency of direct interactions. The default value of intF was 0.1, though other 
values were also explored in robustness tests. In the pairwise cooperation game, an 
 





agent makes the decision based on their own strategy and their belief of the partner’s 
strategy, as elaborated in Table 2. Within a pair, the two players make decisions 
simultaneously. Across pairs, the pairs engage in the games one by one. Through 
direct interactions, agents get payoffs as well as update their “brains” for interaction 
partners.  
2.7.2 Conversation Phase 
Next, N × talkF agents are randomly selected as speakers. talkF indicates the 
frequency of conversations. The default value of talkF was 10, assuming that 
conversations are much more frequent than direct interactions. Other values of talkF 
were also explored in robustness tests. For each selected speaker, a listener is 
randomly selected from their neighbors, if any. If the speaker is a gossiper (AG), the 
speaker gossips to the listener about targetN = 2 targets. As a result, the listener 
updates their “brain” for the two targets, as elaborated above. If the speaker is a non-
gossiper (AN), no action will be conducted. The speakers are randomly selected with 
replacement, so it is possible that an agent speaks for more than one time in an 
iteration. The conversations are conducted one by one.  
2.7.3 Strategy Updating Phase 
N × updF agents are selected2 as “students” who will update their strategies 
based on Fermi rule (Roca et al., 2009). updF indicates the frequency of strategy 
updating or the speed of evolution. updF = 0.01 was used by default, though other 
values were also explored in robustness tests. When updating their strategies, each 
“student” randomly selects a neighbor as their “teacher.” With a probability of p, the 
 





“student” will adopt both the cooperation and gossiping strategies of the “teacher.” 
The magnitude of p is decided by the payoff of the “student,” πs, and the payoff of 
the “teacher,” πt, as shown in Equation (2) and Figure 5. In general, the higher payoff 
the “teacher” has compared to the “student,” the more likely the “student” will adopt 
the “teacher’s” strategies. The parameter s = 5 represents the strength of selection. 
One’s payoff is calculated as the average payoff from all the interactions in the 
current iteration subtracted by the gossip cost, if any. If someone did not interact with 
anyone in the current iteration, the payoff from the latest iteration where there was an 
interaction will be used. If the “teacher” or the “student” has not been involved in any 
interaction throughout the simulation yet, the “student” will not update their strategy. 
The strategy updating process resembles how individuals with low fitness are 
replaced by individuals with higher fitness in the evolution. 
p = 1
1+𝑒𝑒−𝑠𝑠×(πt−πs)
                                                                                  (2) 
In addition to the payoff-based strategy updating, with a probability of µ = 
0.05, a “student” will randomly select a cooperation strategy and a gossiping strategy 
from all the possible strategies, regardless of their payoff. This resembles the random 
mutation in evolution.  
If a “student” changes their strategy in the payoff-based updating or they are 
selected for random mutation, their payoff, behavior history, and “brain” will be reset 
to default. In addition, everyone else’s probability table, overall belief, and 
confidence for this “student” will also be reset to default. The strategy updating 






Figure 5 Probability of Strategy Change in Fermi Rule 
 
Note. The probability of a “student” changing strategy as a function of the payoff 
difference between the “teacher” and the “student.” Selection strength s = 5 in the 






A summary of default model parameters can be found in Table 4. The 
population repeatedly perform the three steps for iterN = 5000 iterations in each 
simulation. This is long enough for the proportion of different strategies to fluctuate 
around a stabilized value. For each simulation, the following four characteristics were 
extracted: 1) cooperation rate, calculated by the proportion of “to cooperate” actions 
in all agents’ latest interactions, 2) the proportion of gossipers (AG), 3) information 
accuracy, calculated by the average of the proportion that an agent’s overall belief of 
a neighbor is the same as that neighbor’s true strategy, and 4) proportion of different 






Table 4 Model Parameters 
Parameter Description Default value 
c Cost of cooperation 1 
b Benefit of cooperation 3 
dirW Information gained from direct interaction, the 
probability increased for the manifested type after 
direct interaction 
0.5 
targetN Number of targets in a gossip conversation 2 
gCost Cost of a piece of gossip 0 
bias Bias toward more confident gossip 5 
indirW Maximum influence of a piece of gossip 0.5 
N Number of agents 200 
swK Average degree in small world network 20 
swP Probability of rewiring each edge when generating 
small world network 
0.5 
m Mobility 0 
cutP Percentage of connections that one cuts when moving 90% 
buildP Percentage of connections of the contact person that 
one builds when relocating 
90% 
intF Frequency of direct interactions 0.1 
talkF Frequency of conversations 10 
updF Frequency of strategy updating 0.01 
s Selection strength in Fermi rule 5 
µ Mutation rate in strategy updating 0.05 







2.8 A Two-Step Approach 
To achieve the research goals of this thesis, I built this project by two-steps. In 
Step 1, I focused only on the information function of gossip. I tuned the model and 
tested whether the new model framework could replicate results from previous 
models on cooperation, reputation, and the information function of gossip. In Step 2, I 
incorporated the influence function of gossip and examined the interaction between 
the information and influence functions, as elaborated below. 
2.8.1 Step 1: Information Function 
In Step 1, only the information function of gossip was examined. Only four 
cooperation strategies were used in this step: 1) always cooperators (AC), 2) always 
defectors (AD), 3) virtuous agents (CC), and 4) exploitive agents (CD). Similarly, in 
agents’ “brains”, only these four strategies were listed in probability tables. ACs and 
ADs do not utilize reputation information to guide their cooperation decisions. Thus, 
they will not directly benefit from the information function of gossip. CCs and CDs 
are the reputation sensitive agents that directly benefit from the information function 
of gossip. Specifically, CCs utilize reputation information virtuously to protect 
themselves from being exploited by defectors. Thus, if gossip boosts information 
accuracy in the population, CCs will be able to better recognize defectors, stop 
cooperating with defectors, and cooperate more effectively with cooperators. CDs, 
however, correspond to the exploitive side of the information function of gossip. 
They utilize reputation information not only to protect themselves, but also to exploit 
others, if possible. By implementing CDs, I extended previous models of indirect 





I did not assume that the information function of gossip necessarily brings more 
cooperation. Instead, it is possible that gossip brings individuals the information to 
exploit others and leads to the collapse of cooperation.  
An experimental model and a control model were contrasted. In both models, 
there were both gossipers (AG) and non-gossipers (AN). The only difference between 
the two models was the frequency of conversations, talkF. In the experimental model, 
talkF = 10, representing a situation where individuals talk frequently. In the control 
model, talkF = 0, representing a situation where individuals do not talk, even they are 
gossipers (AG). Thus, by comparing the two models, I was able to examine how the 
existence of gossip influence information accuracy and cooperation rate in the 
population. Specifically, I compared the following outcomes in the two models: 1) 
information accuracy, which is the precondition of the information function of gossip, 
measured as the average of the proportion that an agent’s overall belief of a neighbor 
is the same as that neighbor’s true strategy, 2) proportions of reputation sensitive 
agents, which reflects the utilization of reputation information, 3) cooperation rates, 
which reflects the function of gossip in the evolution of cooperation, and 4) 
proportions of gossipers, which reflects the evolution of gossipers. 
In addition to the models with default parameters as shown in Table 4, 
robustness tests were also conducted, examining the moderating effects of a variety of 
parameters and model choices. These parameters and model choices included: 1) 
bias, bias toward more confident gossip when listeners receive gossip, 2) intF, 





information from one direct interaction, 5) indirW, maximum influence of a piece of 
gossip, 6) network structures, and 7) updF, frequency of strategy updating.  
2.8.2 Step 2: Information Function and Influence Function 
In Step 2, the model was expanded to examine the influence function of 
gossip. Two gossiper sensitive strategies were added beyond Step 1: 1) hypocritical 
agents (GC) and 2) reverse-hypocritical agents (GD). Hypocritical agents cooperate 
only with gossipers because they want to leave a virtuous reputation in gossip. Thus, 
the evolution of GCs reflects the influence function of gossip. GDs are the opposite of 
GCs. They want to leave a defective reputation. I added GDs to make the model 
“neutral.” That way, the model was not set-up to benefit gossipers. 
A 2 (with vs. without information function) × 2 (with vs. without influence 
function) contrast was made to examine the information function of gossip, the 
influence function of gossip, and their interaction. To manipulate the information 
function of gossip, as in Step 1, we manipulated talkF. When talkF = 10, the 
information function was “on” while when talkF = 0, the information function was 
“off.” The influence function was manipulated as follows: In the “with reputation 
management” condition, gossiper sensitive agents were able to manipulate their 
reputation in front of gossipers, as described in the default model. However, in the 
“without reputation management” condition, everything was the same expect that 
though GCs and GDs still behaved differently toward gossipers vs. non-gossipers, 
they could not manipulate their reputation in the gossip. GCs would be perceived as 
GCs for both gossipers and non-gossipers and GDs would be perceived as GDs. This 





agents could not manipulate their reputation even by cooperating/defecting with 
gossipers. In all the 2 × 2 conditions, there were both gossipers (AG) and non-
gossipers (AN). 
With this contrast, I examined the following outcomes: 1) information 
accuracy and proportions of reputation sensitive agents, which reflects the 
information function of gossip, 2) the proportions of gossiper sensitive agents, which 
reflects the influence function of gossip, 3) cooperation rates, and 4) the evolution of 
gossipers. 
A variety of robustness tests were also conducted in Step 2 to examine the 
moderating effects of different parameters and model choices. These parameters and 
model choices include: 1) bias, 2) intF, 3) talkF, 4) dirW, 5) indirW, 6) network 






Chapter 3: Results 
3.1 Step 1: The Information Function of Gossip 
Figure 6 shows the effects of gossip on information accuracy and the 
proportions of reputation sensitive agents, cooperation, and gossipers. The results 
were got by contrasting 30 simulation runs in a population where agents are allowed 
to “talk” (talkF = 10) vs. 30 simulation runs where the conversations are “blocked” 
(talkF = 0). Plot A shows that when agents are allowed to talk and gossip, agents 
have more accurate beliefs about their neighbors’ strategies (t(30) = 23.29, p < 0.001) 
compared with the control condition. Plot B shows that when agents are allowed to 
gossip, more agents evolve to be reputation sensitive and utilize reputation 
information to guide their cooperation decisions (CC: t(58) = 2.45, p = 0.017; CD: 
t(39) = 4.55, p < 0.001). Moreover, there are fewer unconditional defectors (AD) 
when there is gossip (t(29) = -5.39, p < 0.001). Plot 3 shows that the existence of 
gossip increases overall cooperation rate (t(32) = 9.03, p < 0.001). Altogether, these 
results support and have replicated the information function of gossip: The existence 
of gossip increases reputation accessibility and the proportion of agents who utilize 
reputation information to guide their decisions. As a result, more cooperation evolves 
across the population. The causal relationship between reputation accessibility and 
cooperation is further elaborated in the “Reputation Accessibility and Cooperation” 
section below. 
Despite the effects of gossip on cooperation, Plot 4 shows that evolution 
favors neither gossipers nor non-gossipers in this setting. The proportions of 





p = 0.270). In the “with gossip” condition, the proportion of gossipers do not differ 
from chance (one sample t-test from 0.5, t(29) = -0.47, p = 0.643). In fact, further 
analyses show that even if a little cost is implemented to gossiping, it will cause the 
proportion of gossipers to drop dramatically (see Figure S2). This indicates that the 
information function of gossip alone is not sufficient to explain the prevalence of 







Figure 6 The Information Function of Gossip 
 
Note. Results from 60 simulations. 30 of them are from a population where agents 
have frequent conversations (“with gossip”, talkF = 10) while the other 30 are from a 
population where there is no conversation (“no gossip”, talkF = 0). For this figure and 
all the figures below, unless specified, each data point in the scatter plot represents a 
single simulation. The value is calculated as the average value from the 4000th to the 
5000th iteration in that simulation. The middle dots in the error bars show the mean 








AC: Unconditional cooperator 







3.2 Step 1: Robustness Tests 
In this section, I provide evidence from additional experiments that supports 
the information function of gossip. I also examine the robustness and boundary 
conditions of the model by using different model choices. These model choices 
included: 1) bias, bias toward more confident gossip when listeners receive gossip, 2) 
intF, frequency of direct interactions, 3) talkF, frequency of conversations, 4) dirW, 
information from one direct interaction, 5) indirW, maximum influence of a piece of 
gossip, 6) network structures, and 7) updF, frequency of strategy updating. In general, 
the information function of gossip is robustly supported across various model choices. 
3.2.1 Reputation Accessibility and Cooperation 
To support that reputation accessibility is the key factor that mediates the 
effects of gossip on cooperation, I did an experiment that exogenously manipulates 
reputation accessibility and directly examines its effects on the evolution of 
cooperation. In this experiment, the set-up is the same as the default model in Step 1, 
except that agents’ beliefs are exogenously implemented with a certain level of 
accuracy, instead of endogenously got from interactions or gossip. By implementing 
different levels of information accuracy, I examined how information accuracy 
influences agents’ cooperation strategies and behavior. 
Figure 7 shows that in general, the population indeed cooperate more as they 
have more accurate information. However, the effect follows a piecewise function 
where information accuracy only increases cooperation when it is sufficiently high. 
Specifically, Plot A shows that when information accuracy is below a certain 





enough, cooperation rate increases as information accuracy increases. Plot B shows 
that when there is not enough information, unconditional cooperators (AD) take the 
major part of the population. However, after information accuracy has passed a 
threshold, more reputation sensitive agents evolve as information accuracy increases. 
These results not only support the importance of reputation accessibility in the 
evolution of cooperation but are also consistent with Nowak (2006), which indicated 
that indirect reciprocity through reputation can only promote cooperation when the 
reputation information is prevalent enough. Moreover, the piecewise relationship 
between information accuracy and cooperation suggests that gossip should have the 
strongest impact on cooperation when it can boost information accuracy up to above 
the threshold. Overall, these results support that as long as gossip can increase 
reputation accessibility to a sufficiently high level, it will benefit cooperation through 







Figure 7 Effects of Information Accuracy on Cooperation 
 
Note. 30 simulations in each condition. Agents did not talk in these conditions (talkF 
= 0). Instead, information accuracy is exogenously manipulated. Plot A shows when 
information accuracy is below a certain threshold, cooperation rate is very low. 
However, when information accuracy is high enough, cooperation rate increases as 










when there is not enough information, unconditional defectors (AD) take the major 
part of the population. However, after information accuracy has passed a threshold, 






3.2.2 Effects of Bias (bias) 
In the default model, we assume that agents are biased to learn from others 
who are more confident about their beliefs (Birch et al., 2010; Jaswal & Malone, 
2007) and the differentiation between confident vs. unconfident gossip is captured by 
the parameter bias (see Figure 4). In the default model, we set bias = 5. Through 
further exploration, we found that this value is essential for whether gossip can 
successfully boost information accuracy. Specifically, Plot A in Figure 8 shows that 
gossip only increases information accuracy when agents are highly biased toward 
more confident gossip. Otherwise, if agents cannot weigh confident vs. unconfident 
gossip discriminatively, the existence of gossip even compromises information 
accuracy compared with the control group. As a result, Plots B and C show that 
gossip only benefits cooperation when bias is sufficiently high. Otherwise, gossip will 
harm cooperation because of the compromised information accuracy. 
These results have important implications both methodologically and 
theoretically. For its methodological implication, much previous modeling work on 
gossip directly assumed that gossip increases reputation accessibility (e.g., Enquist & 
Leimar, 1993). Some other modeling work did not make such assumption, but 
because the agents in those models always get either fully correct information or no 
information about a target, gossip always brings accurate information (e.g., Giardini 
et al., 2014). My model relaxes this restriction and shows that if agents learn about 
others’ reputation gradually but are allowed to gossip with imperfect information, 
gossip does not necessarily increase reputation accessibility. In this case, gossip may 





For its theoretical implication, these results show that biased learning may be 
the key for individuals to figure out correct information from imperfect gossip and for 
the information function of gossip to take effect. Especially when people are allowed 
to gossip regardless of their knowledge about the target, it is crucial to differentiate 
more reliable gossip from random guesses and take the former more seriously. 
Otherwise, the truth and rumors will counteract each other, and gossip will decrease 







Figure 8 Effects of Bias 
 
Note. On the left of each plot are conditions with gossip (yellow, talkF = 10) and with 
different levels of bias. On the right is the condition without gossip (black, talkF = 0) 
as the control condition. There are 30 simulations in each condition, except for the 
bias = 10 condition, where there are only 29 simulations due to computer error. Plot 
A shows when bias is low, gossip does not increase information accuracy compared 










agents do not differentiate between confident and unconfident gossip. As a result, 






3.2.3 Effects of the Frequency of Direct Interactions (intF) 
Next, I examined how the frequency of direct interactions moderates the 
information function of gossip. Figure 9 shows that gossip has stronger effects on 
boosting information accuracy and cooperation when direct interactions are 
infrequent. This is because if individuals frequently interact in cooperation games, 
they can learn each other’s reputation from these interactions directly and no longer 
need to rely on gossip. Nevertheless, in any situation, gossip increases information 
accuracy and cooperation rate, supporting the robustness of the results. 
 










3.2.4 Effects of the Frequency of Conversations (talkF) 
Next, I examined how the frequency of conversations moderates the 
information function of gossip. Frequency of conversations (talkF) controls how 
many agents are selected per iteration to speak. Holding the proportion of gossipers 
constant, this also reflects the frequency of gossiping. Figure 10 shows that even a 
small amount of gossip (e.g., talkF = 0.5) increases information accuracy and 
cooperation substantially compared with the control condition (i.e., talkF = 0). 
However, the amount of gossip shows a slightly curvilinear effect. When there is too 
much gossip (e.g. talkF > 20), information accuracy and cooperation start to decrease 
as the frequency of gossip increases. This is probably because the surplus of 
inaccurate gossip pollutes the information pool. Nevertheless, in general, the 
existence of gossip increases reputation accessibility and cooperation, showing the 







Figure 10 Effects of Conversation Frequency 
 
Note. Each condition represents a level of conversation frequency (talkF). When 
talkF = 0, it represents the control condition where there is no gossip. There are 30 
simulations in each condition, except for the talkF = 2 condition, where there are only 












3.2.5 Effects of the Amount of Information From Direct Interaction (dirW) 
Next, I examined how the results are moderated by the amount of information 
that an individual gains from one direct interaction (dirW). This can be interpreted as 
the depth of interaction. The higher the dirW is, the more knowledge an individual 
gains about their partner from an interaction. Plot A in Figure 11 shows that gossip 
increases information accuracy effectively across a broad range of interaction depth, 
though Plot B shows that gossip is more effective for increasing cooperation when 
interaction depth is low. This is because when interaction depth is low, information 
accuracy is low without gossip. Thus, gossip can boost the reputation accessibility up 






Figure 11 Effects of Interaction Depth 
 
Note. Each condition represents a level of interaction depth, which is manipulated as 
the amount of information that an individual gains about their partner from one direct 
interaction (dirW). There are 30 simulations in each condition, expect for the dirW = 










3.2.6 Effects of the Maximum Influence of a Piece of Gossip (indirW) 
I also examined the effects of the maximum influence of gossip (indirW). This 
parameter can be interpreted as the extent to which individuals rely on gossip to form 
their belief of another person. Figure 12 shows that for a broad range of indirW, the 
existence of gossip increases information accuracy and cooperation. There is also a 
trend that the effects of gossip reliance is curvilinear. For gossip to be most effective, 
individuals need to rely on gossip neither too much nor too little. If they are not 
influenced enough by gossip, the information in gossip will not be as helpful. 
However, if they are influenced too much by gossip, it will compromise the 
knowledge learnt from direct interactions, which harms information accuracy and 
cooperation. Nevertheless, the main results of Step 1 hold robust that over a broad 






Figure 12 Effects of the Influence of Gossip 
 
Note. On the left of each plot are conditions with gossip (yellow, talkF = 10) and with 
different levels of reliance on gossip (indirW). On the right is the condition without 
gossip (black, talkF = 0) as the control condition. For a broad range of indirW, the 









3.2.7 Effects of Network Structures 
I also examined the effects of network structures. To do that, I tested a small 
world network with a higher average degree (i.e., average number of neighbors, swK 
= 50). I also tested a random regular network with different levels of degree (d = [10, 
20, 50]). Figure 13 shows that, in general, gossip increases information accuracy and 
cooperation across a variety of network structures. The only exception happens when 
the degree of a network is very low (i.e., d = 10 in a random regular network). This is 
because when agents have few neighbors, they can get sufficient information just 
from direct interactions. In this case, the effect of gossip is limited. Overall, these 
results support the robustness of the model. 
 










3.2.8 Effects of the Frequency of Strategy Updating (updF) 
Finally, I examined the effects of the frequency of strategy updating. This can 
be interpreted as the speed of evolution. Figure 14 shows that the existence of gossip 
increases information accuracy and cooperation across all the conditions that have 
been tested, supporting the robustness of the results. 
 











Overall, the robustness tests show that when reputation accessibility is 
sufficiently high, more accurate information leads to more cooperation in the 
population. Thus, the information function of gossip will benefit cooperation as long 
as gossip can effectively boost information accuracy. However, gossip can lead to 
more accurate information only when individuals are biased toward more confident 
gossip. If so, gossip will increase reputation accessibility and thus benefit the 
evolution of cooperation. These results hold robust over a variety of model choices. 
However, in none of the simulations mentioned above, does evolution favor 
either gossipers or non-gossipers. Thus, the current model cannot explain the 
mechanism of why gossipers evolve. The mechanism of the evolution of gossipers is 






3.3 Step 2: Both the Information and Influence Functions of Gossip 
In this section, two additional cooperation strategies, hypocritical (GC) and 
reverse-hypocritical (GD), were added. A 2 (with vs. without gossip) × 2 (with vs. 
without reputation management) contrast was made to examine the information 
function, the influence function, and their interaction. The first variable (i.e., with vs. 
without gossip) corresponds to the information function of gossip, as elaborated in 
Step 1. The second variable (i.e., with vs. without reputation management) 
corresponds to the influence function of gossip. In the “with reputation management” 
condition, gossiper sensitive agents (i.e., GCs and GDs) can manage their reputations 
in gossip by behaving differently in front of gossipers vs. non-gossipers, manifesting 
the influence function of gossip. On the contrary, in the “no reputation management” 
condition, gossiper sensitive agents cannot manage their reputations, and the 
influence function is “blocked.” 
 Figure 15 shows the effects of the two variables on reputation accessibility, 
cooperation, and the evolution of gossipers. Plot A shows that in general, the 
existence of gossip increases information accuracy through the information function 
of gossip, as found in Step 1 (main effect of gossip: F(1, 116) = 721.75, p < 0.001). 
Though there is an interaction between the information and the influence functions of 
gossip (F(1, 116) = 8.37, p = 0.005), in general, allowing agents to manage their 
reputation in front of gossipers decreases information accuracy (simple main effects: 
with gossip, t(58) = -4.24, p < 0.001; no gossip, t(37) = -8.54, p < 0.001). This is 






Interestingly, Plot B shows that though the information accuracy is 
compromised by reputation management, the cooperation rate is the highest when 
allowing for both reputation management and gossiping. Specifically, if gossiping is 
allowed, the cooperation rate is significantly higher when agents are also allowed to 
manage their reputations (simple main effect: t(44) = 3.08, p = 0.004), though if 
gossiping is not allowed, reputation management shows no significant effect (simple 
main effect: t(57) = -1.57, p = 0.122; interaction effect: F(1, 116) = 7.18, p = 0.008). 
These results show that when reputation management is allowed, the information 
function of gossip is compromised, but the influence function becomes effective in 
boosting cooperation despite the less accurate information. 
The influence function of gossip is also reflected on the evolution of 
hypocritical agents (GC). As shown in Plot C in Figure 15, a substantial proportion of 
agents become hypocritical when they can manage their reputation in gossip and 
particularly when gossip is transmitted frequently (interaction effect: F(1, 116) = 
103.23, p < 0.001; simple main effects: with gossip, t(30) = 12.89, p < 0.001; no 
gossip, t(46) = 3.31, p = 0.002). On the contrary, there are few reverse-hypocritical 
agents in any condition (see Plot D). The evolution of hypocritical agents shows that 
the threat of gossip prevents individuals from defecting at least in front of gossipers. 
However, the influence function of gossip is only effective when agents actually 
gossip. If the information function is “blocked,” gossiping loses its influence function 
as well. 
Most importantly, with the existence of both the information and influence 





(89.69%) of the population evolve to be gossipers if both gossiping and reputation 
management are allowed (interaction effect: F(1, 116) = 57.144, p < 0.001; simple 
main effects: with gossip, t(35) = 12.05, p < 0.001; no gossip, t(51) = 1.58, p = 
0.119). Moreover, further analyses show that a substantial proportion of gossipers 
evolve even when gossipers need to spend a cost to gossip (see Figure S3), showing 
the robustness of the evolution of gossipers under the current model set-up. 
Gossipers evolve because of the joint effect of the information and influence 
functions. Specifically, when gossip conveys reputation information, a substantial 
proportion of reputation sensitive agents evolve. These agents cooperate only with the 
agents who have cooperative reputations. Thus, it becomes important to have a good 
reputation in gossip. However, it will be even more beneficial if someone can also act 
selfishly privately. Thus, hypocritical agents evolve. In particular, these agents 
cooperate exclusively with gossipers so that they gain both good reputations and extra 
material payoffs when there is no threat of gossip. The existence of hypocritical 
agents gives gossipers an advantage over non-gossipers because being able to gossip 
becomes deterrent and protects them from being exploited by hypocritical agents. 
This leads to the evolution of gossipers. Moreover, the evolution of gossipers further 
increases the prevalence of reputation information and thus facilitates the cycle. 
Eventually, the majority of the population evolve to be gossipers. A substantial 
proportion of agents become hypocritical. Notably, though the hypocritical agents 
have the potential to be exploitive, they end up cooperating for most of the time 
because of the high proportion of gossipers. Thus, gossipers and cooperation 





Figure 15 The Information and Influence Functions of Gossip 
 
Note. Results from a 2 × 2 contrast. There are 30 simulations in each condition. In the 
“with gossip” conditions, agents are allowed to have conversations and gossip (talkF 












the information function of gossip is “blocked.” In the “with rep manage” conditions, 
gossiper sensitive agents are allowed to manage their reputations by behaving 
differently in front of gossipers vs. non-gossipers. In the “no rep manage” condition, 
agents cannot manage their reputation and thus the influence function is “blocked.” 
Plots A and B show that when agents can manage their reputation, reputation 
information becomes less accurate, but the influence function leads to more 
cooperation. Plots C and E show that a substantial proportion of agents evolve to be 
hypocritical and the majority of the population become gossipers as a result of the 






3.4 Step 2: Robustness Tests 
In this section, I examined the robustness and boundary conditions of the 
results in Step 2 by using different model choices. These model choices include: 1) 
bias, bias toward more confident gossip, 2) intF, frequency of direct interactions, 3) 
talkF, frequency of conversations, 4) dirW, information from one direct interaction, 
5) indirW, maximum influence of a piece of gossip, 6) network structures, 7) updF, 
frequency of strategy updating, and 8) m, mobility. In general, I show that across a 
variety of model choices, the results in Step 2 hold robust.  
3.4.1 Effects of Bias (bias) 
Figure 16 shows the effects of bias on information accuracy, cooperation rate, 
and the evolution of hypocritical agents and gossipers. Plot A replicates the results in 
Step 1 that a sufficiently high bias is essential for agents to figure out accurate 
information through gossip. By comparing the “with rep mange” condition with the 
“no rep manage” condition, it also supports the results in Step 2 that information 
accuracy is compromised when agents can manage their reputation in gossip. Plot B 
shows that gossip benefits cooperation only when bias is high enough. Moreover, a 
sufficiently high bias is particularly important when reputation management is 
allowed. Plots C and D show that hypocritical agents and gossipers evolve only when 
both the information and influence functions of gossip exist and when bias is high 
enough. In general, these results support the main results of Step 2 as well as 







Figure 16 Effects of Bias 
 
Note. On the left of each subplot are conditions with gossip (yellow, talkF = 10) and 
with different levels of bias. On the right is the condition without gossip (black, talkF 











3.4.2 Effects of the Frequency of Direct Interactions (intF) 
Figure 17 shows how interaction frequency moderates the results. In general, 
the main results of Step 2 are supported. Plot A shows that when agents can manage 
their reputation, the information function is compromised, especially when 
interactions are frequent. This is because the manipulation of reputation happens 
during direct interactions. Plot B shows that though the information function is 
compromised, the cooperation is the highest when agents manage their reputations. 
The results are robust across a wide range of values of interaction frequency, 
supporting the influence function of gossip. Plot C shows the evolution of 
hypocritical agents when both gossiping and reputation management are allowed and 
the proportion of hypocritical agents is particularly high when direct interactions are 
frequent. Finally, Plot E shows that the majority of the population evolve to be 
gossipers when both gossiping and reputation management are allowed, as long as the 
interaction frequency is not so low, replicating the main results in Step 2. 
However, I also noticed that some gossipers evolve even when they do not 
actually gossip, as long as reputation management is allowed, especially when the 
interaction frequency is high (statistics from two-way ANOVA among conditions 
without gossip: main effect of reputation management: F(1, 348) = 37.83, p < 0.001; 
interaction effect between reputation management and interaction frequency: F(5, 
348) = 5.32, p < 0.001). This is probability because hypocritical agents (GC) have a 
slight advantage over reverse-hypocritical agents (GD) (see Plots C and D) and that 





in Step 2 hold robust that the influence function of gossip and the deterrent power that 
gossipers have on hypocritical agents are the key to the evolution of gossipers. 
 















3.4.3 Effects of the Frequency of Conversations (talkF) 
In this section, I examined how the frequency of conversations moderates the 
results. Frequency of conversations (talkF) controls how many agents are selected per 
iteration to speak. Thus, the amount of gossip per iteration depends jointly on the 
conversation frequency and the proportion of gossipers. Figure 18 supports the 
robustness of the results in Step 2. Plots A and B show that reputation management in 
front of gossipers compromises information accuracy but increases cooperation. Plot 
C shows the evolution of hypocritical agents when they can manage their reputation 
in front of gossipers and particularly when conversations are frequent. Plot D shows 


















3.4.4 Effects of the Amount of Information From Direct Interaction (dirW) 
Figure 19 shows the robustness of the results across a variety of choices of 
interaction depth. Plots A and B show that reputation management in front of 
gossipers compromises information accuracy but increases cooperation rate, as a 
result of the influence function of gossip. Plot C shows the evolution of hypocritical 
agents when they can manage their reputation in front of gossipers. Plot D shows that 
the majority evolve to be gossipers when both reputation management and gossiping 
are allowed. Again, I noticed a slight trend for the evolution of gossipers even when 
gossipers are not allowed to gossip (statistics from two-way ANOVA among 
conditions without gossip: main effect of reputation management: F(1, 290) = 14.42, 


















3.4.5 Effects of the Maximum Influence of a Piece of Gossip (indirW) 
Figure 20 shows the robustness of the results across a variety of choices of the 
maximum influence of gossip. Once again, Plots A and B show that reputation 
management in front of gossipers compromises information accuracy but increases 
cooperation rate, as a result of the influence function of gossip. Same as in Step 1, 
there is a slight trend that the effect of gossip reliance is curvilinear. For gossip to be 
most effective in boosting cooperation, individuals need to rely neither too much nor 
too little on gossip. Plot C shows the evolution of hypocritical agents when they can 
manage their reputation in front of gossipers. Plot D shows that the majority evolve to 







Figure 20 Effects of the Influence of Gossip 
 
Note. On the left of each plot are conditions with gossip (yellow, talkF = 10) and with 
different levels of reliance on gossip (indirW). On the right is the condition without 
gossip (black, talkF = 0) as the control condition. There are 30 simulations in each 
condition, except for when indirW = 0.1 in the “with rep manage” condition, where 











3.4.6 Effects of Network Structures 
I also tested the model on a random regular network with different levels of 
degree (d = [10, 20, 50]). Figure 21 shows that, across various network choices, the 
results in Step 2 are replicated. Plots A shows that reputation management in front of 
gossipers compromises information accuracy (statistics from two-way ANOVA 
among conditions with gossip: main effect of reputation management: F(1, 233) = 
25.39, p < 0.001). Plot B shows that reputation management increases cooperation 
when gossiping is enabled. Plots C and D show the evolution of hypocritical agents 
and gossipers as a result of the joint impact of the information and influence functions 
of gossip. Moreover, the proportion of hypocritical agents and gossipers are 
particularly high when the network degree is high. This is because as agents have 
more neighbors, they have to learn the reputation of many targets. It becomes 
increasingly important to learn about these neighbors’ reputation from gossip. Thus, 







Figure 21 Effects of Network Structures 
 
Note. All the results in this figure are drawn from populations embedded in random 
regular networks with different levels of average degree (d). There are 30 simulations 
in each condition, except for when d = 50 in the “with rep manage” and “with gossip” 











3.4.7 Effects of the Frequency of Strategy Updating (updF) 
I also examined how the frequency of strategy updating (updF) moderates the 
effects of gossip as well as the evolution of gossipers. Plots C and D in Figure 22 
show that the evolution of hypocritical agents and gossipers only happen when 
updating frequency is low. From an evolutionary perspective, this means that for 
gossipers to evolve, the evolution has to happen slowly so that an individual can live 
long enough to have many chances to interact and gossip with others. As a result, the 
results in Step 2 hold robust only when updating frequency is low.  
 











3.4.8 Effects of Network Mobility (m) 
Finally, I examined how network mobility moderates the effects of gossip as 
well as the evolution of gossipers. To implement different levels of network mobility 
(m), at the end of each iteration, N × m agents are randomly selected to move.3 If an 
agent moves, they cut their connections with their original neighbors and build 
connections with a new neighborhood, as explained in the Method section.  
Figure 23 manifests both the information and the influence functions of gossip 
under mobility. With respect to the information function of gossip, Plot A shows that 
when there is no gossip, as mobility increases, reputation accessibility decreases 
because agents have to interact with new neighbors frequently. However, the 
existence of gossip maintains reputation accessibility at a relatively high level even 
when mobility is high. As a result, Plot B shows that the existence of gossip helps 
maintain a high cooperation rate even under high mobility. Moreover, Plots A and B 
support the results in Step 2 that reputation management decreases information 
accuracy but increases cooperation rate. Plots C and D show that hypocritical agents 
and gossipers evolve across different mobility values as a result of the joint effect of 
the information and influence functions of gossip. There is a slight trend that the 
proportion of gossipers is the highest when mobility is low. This is probably because 
if mobility is too high, the neighborhood changes so fast that the deterrent power of 
gossipers is compromised. However, overall, the results of Step 2 hold robust across 
different levels of mobility. 
  
 


















Overall, I have showed that over a broad range of model choices, being able to 
manage one’s reputation under the threat of gossip compromises information 
accuracy, but the reputation concern leads to more cooperation across the population, 
showing the influence function of gossip. Moreover, the majority of the population 
evolve to be gossipers under the joint impact of the information and influence 
functions of gossip. The evolution of gossipers is robust across a variety of model 
choices and even when gossiping is costly. These results show that the influence 
function of gossip not only increases cooperation but also is the key mechanism for 






Chapter 4: Discussion 
4.1 Summary of Results 
This thesis built an agent-based EGT model to examine the functions of 
gossip in the evolution of cooperation as well as the mechanism of the evolution of 
gossipers. To do that, in Step 1, I built a model that manifested the information 
function of gossip. In this model, the existence of gossip increases reputation 
accessibility. As a result, most agents evolve to utilize reputation information; 
cooperation increases in the population. These findings are consistent with previous 
work on indirect reciprocity and the information function of gossip (Enquist & 
Leimar, 1993; Nowak, 2006; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a). However, in Step 1, the 
evolution of gossipers is not observed, which indicates that the information function 
of gossip alone is not sufficient for explaining why gossipers evolved in the first 
place. 
In Step 2, I built a model that incorporates both the information and the 
influence functions of gossip. In this model, when agents are able to behave 
differently in front of gossipers vs. non-gossipers to manage their reputation in 
gossip, accessibility of agents’ true strategies is decreased. Thus, the information 
function of gossip is compromised. However, a substantial proportion of agents 
evolve to be susceptible to the influence function of gossip and cooperate when under 
the threat of gossip. The influence function of gossip leads to more cooperation 
despite the compromised information function of gossip. 
Most importantly, gossipers evolve under the joint impacts of the information 





function of gossip, and 3) the influence function of gossip form a positive feedback 
loop, which is sufficient to sustain the evolution of gossipers (see Figure 24). In the 
cycle, the existence of gossip increases reputation accessibility through its 
information function and makes the utilization of reputation information effective and 
necessary. As reputation becomes more important, individuals are motivated to leave 
a good reputation in gossip by cooperating with gossipers, in which gossip manifests 
its influence function. As more individuals cooperate with gossipers, gossipers gain 
an advantage over non-gossipers and proliferate in the population. The prevalence of 
gossipers reinforces the importance of reputation and enhances the information and 
influence functions of gossip. Eventually, most individuals become gossipers and 
behave cooperatively as a result of the joint impact of the information and influence 
functions of gossip. Results in Step 2 also show that all the links in this cycle are 
necessary to sustain the evolution of gossipers. If either the information or the 
influence function of gossip is “blocked,” there will not be a substantial proportion of 














4.2 Factors Moderating the Information Function of Gossip 
I also examined the factors that moderate the functions of gossip and tested 
the robustness of the models under a variety of model choices. 
First, in Step 1, I examined the factors that moderate the impact of gossip on 
reputation accessibility. Results show that gossip only increases reputation 
accessibility when more credible gossip is given more weight in the belief updating 
process. Moreover, gossip has a stronger impact on reputation accessibility when the 
amount of information got from direct interactions is not sufficient. Therefore, the 
information function of gossip is more profound when direct interaction is less 
frequent, when individuals have more neighbors, and when strategy updating happens 
more frequently. Furthermore, because gossip only provides secondhand information 
and there is noise in it, individuals must avoid overusing gossip. Thus, gossip benefits 
reputation accessibility the most when individuals gossip and rely on gossip neither 
too little nor too much. 
Second, in Step 1, I examined the factors that moderate the impact of gossip 
on cooperation through its information function. In general, higher reputation 
accessibility leads to more cooperation, so the situations where gossip is more 
beneficial for reputation accessibility are also the situations where gossip is more 
beneficial for cooperation. However, gossip benefits cooperation the most when the 
information accuracy without gossip is low enough. Thus, gossip has the strongest 
impact on cooperation through its information function when individuals interact very 
infrequently, when they only have shallow interactions, when individuals have many 





4.3 Factors Moderating the Influence Function of Gossip 
I then examined the factors that moderate the influence function of gossip in 
Step 2. The influence function of gossip can be reflected by the evolution of 
hypocritical individuals who behave more cooperatively under the threat of gossip. 
The situations where the influence function is the strongest are different from the 
situations where the information function is the strongest. On the contrary, since the 
deterrent power from gossipers happens during direct interactions, the influence 
function of gossip is more prominent when individuals interact frequently and when 
the interactions are deep. Moreover, the impact of the influence function also depends 
on whether gossip can convey reputation information effectively. Thus, the influence 
function is more prominent when bias is high enough, when conversations happen 
frequently, when individuals have many neighbors, and when individuals rely neither 
too much nor too little on gossip. Moreover, the influence function is more prominent 
when the network and individuals’ status are relatively steady, i.e., when network 
mobility is low and when strategy updating is infrequent. 
4.4 Factors Moderating the Evolution of Gossipers 
Finally, I examined the factors that moderate the evolution of gossipers. Since 
hypocritical individuals and gossipers evolve hand in hand, in general, the situations 
where the influence function of gossip is the most prominent are also the situations 
where gossipers are most likely to evolve. To summarize, more gossipers evolve 1) 
when individuals interact frequently, 2) when the interactions are deep (i.e., when one 
can gain much information about their partner from one single interaction), 3) when 





many neighbors, 6) when individuals rely much on gossip, 7) when network mobility 
is low, and 8) when strategy updating is infrequent.  
4.5 Contributions of This Thesis 
This thesis has contributed to gossip research both methodologically and 
theoretically. Methodologically, I created an EGT modeling framework that 
incorporates the processes of both cooperation and gossiping, incorporates both the 
information and the influence functions of gossip, and is able to study the role of 
gossip in the evolution of cooperation as well as the evolution of gossipers. My 
modeling framework is novel from the following aspects. 
First, compared with research on indirect reciprocity that treated one’s 
reputation as a rating that is public to everyone (e.g., Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a), I 
assume that reputation is stored in people’s minds and everyone may have a unique 
belief of other’s reputation based on their previous experiences. The heterogeneity of 
information is the precondition for gossip to make a difference to reputation 
accessibility. 
Second, compared with the models that directly assumed that gossip increases 
reputation accessibility (e.g., Enquist & Leimar, 1993), I implement the specific 
processes of gossip transmission and examine the effects of gossip on reputation 
accessibility. I show that gossip can only increase reputation accessibility when 
people give more weight to more credible gossip. In fact, my model can be applied 
not only to studying the transmission of gossip but also to studying other information 





Third, even compared with previous models that also implemented gossip 
transmission processes (e.g., Giardini & Vilone, 2016), my model is more flexible 
and realistic. Previous models usually assumed reputation as a one-dimensional 
judgment that is either “good” or “bad.” However, people can behave differently 
under different conditions. My model incorporates this in the reputation system by 
making X’s reputation in Y’s mind as a strategy that captures the conditional 
behaviors that Y believes X will do under different conditions. The belief of other’s 
strategy resembles the ability of theory of mind in human cognition (Dunbar, 1997; 
Perner, & Wimmer, 1985) and it is essential for individuals to make conditional 
decisions based on their beliefs of others. 
Fourth, different from many other models that assumed that one can know 
about someone else’s strategy after a single interaction (e.g., Giardini & Vilone, 
2016), I assume that learning about a person’s strategy is a gradual process and 
people may make mistakes throughout this process. At the same time, people may 
start gossiping before they get perfect information. This may lead to inaccuracy in 
gossip and is also the reason why gossip may not benefit reputation accessibility 
under some conditions. This assumption not only is more realistic but also opens up 
new directions to examine the factors that influence the accuracy of gossip.  
Fifth, in addition to the strategies often used in models of indirect reciprocity 
(e.g., Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a), I implement two extra gossiper sensitive strategies 
(i.e., GC and GD). This set-up has gone beyond previous models on the information 





Sixth, and most importantly, my model examines the evolution of gossipers 
directly. So far as I know, all previous models have set the proportion of gossipers as 
an exogenous variable, which made it unable to examine why gossipers appear in the 
first place. Using an EGT framework, I make gossiping behavior an evolvable 
strategy and examine the evolution of gossipers as an emerging phenomenon.  
Finally, the set-ups in the current model go beyond traditional EGT models 
that assume minimal cognitive ability of agents and focus mainly on population level 
processes. Based on psychological theories, my model incorporates various intra- and 
inter-personal processes into the traditional EGT framework, such as belief 
representation (Johnson-Laird et al., 1999), metacognition (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 
2008), theory of mind (Dunbar, 1997; Perner, & Wimmer, 1985), communication and 
information diffusion (Weenig & Midden, 1991), trust and information processing 
(Jaswal & Malone, 2007), etc. Such integration of individual and population level 
processes expands the scope of application of EGT approach and enables the model 
to study more complicated social behaviors that are of interest to psychologists, 
which can be a promising future direction for EGT approach (Pan et al., in press). 
My model has also made several theoretical contributions to psychological 
research. First, in general, my results support previous findings on the information 
function of gossip. However, I have extended this research by showing that when 
people cannot differentiate between credible and incredible gossip, the information 
function of gossip may have a negative effect on the evolution of cooperation. This 
finding is applicable not only to gossip research but also to research on information 





Second, my model shows that it is evolutionarily adaptive to develop 
reputational concerns and behave more cooperatively in front of gossipers. The 
influence function of gossip has been widely discussed in psychological literatures 
(e.g., Feinberg et al., 2012; Piazza & Bering, 2008; Wu et al., 2019). While empirical 
studies usually focus on describing the prevalence of this phenomenon, the current 
model examines the evolutionary basis of it—whether and under what circumstances 
are hypocritical strategies evolutionary adaptive. Thus, my model is a useful 
supplementary to the empirical research on the influence function of gossip and the 
motivation of reputational concerns. 
Third, I show that though the influence function of gossip makes it difficult to 
figure out what others will do privately, it increases cooperation in general because of 
the prevalence of gossipers. Moreover, the influence function of gossip only benefits 
cooperation when gossipers really gossip. If gossipers only have the potential to 
gossip but do not actually share the information, hypocritical individuals will not 
evolve as much. Thus, the information and influence functions work together to 
benefit the evolution of cooperation. Though the similar findings can be inferred from 
previous empirical research, this thesis tests the interactions between the two 
functions of gossip directly. While it is easy to “turn off” the information function of 
gossip in empirical studies by prohibiting participants from gossiping, it is usually 
hard to completely “turn off” the influence function because people in laboratory 
settings still face the constraints from social norms, reputational concerns, and social 
desirability (Nederhof, 1985). As a result, it is difficult for empirical research to 





Thanks to the flexibility of agent-based models, my thesis examines the effects of the 
influence function of gossip directly and expands the scope of empirical research. 
Fourth, and most importantly, I have identified the mechanism for the 
evolution of gossipers. Though the prevalence of gossipers has been proved by 
numerous empirical studies, it remains unclear why such behavior has evolved in the 
first place. With a computational model from an evolutionary perspective, I show that 
the joint effect of the information and influence functions of gossip can sustain the 
evolution of gossipers. Admittedly, there might be other mechanisms, such as the 
entertaining or social bonding functions of gossip. Nevertheless, my findings indicate 
that the role of gossip in cooperation alone is sufficient to explain the prevalence of 
gossipers in human society. This thesis, thus, has pushed previous research from the 
“how” to the “why” questions of gossip (Varnum & Grossmann, 2017). 
Finally, I have examined the effects of a variety of variables that moderate the 
effects of gossip on cooperation as well as the evolution of gossipers. Though there is 
great between-group diversity on these moderators, many of them are difficult to 
manipulate in laboratory settings, making it hard to test the causal effects of these 
moderators directly. My model, however, has provided a handy tool to directly test 
the effects of these moderators. Combined with archival data, these moderators can be 
used to understand the variance in gossip across societies. For example, my results 
show that gossipers are more likely to evolve in a population where people have 
many neighbors, when they have deep and frequent interactions and frequent 
conversations, when mobility is low, and when strategy updating is infrequent. This is 





communities (Haugen & Villa, 2006). This thesis has also raised many testable 
hypotheses that, once validated by empirical data, can be valuable for psychological 
research. For example, I show that the information accuracy is the highest when 
people gossip neither too little nor too much. This result can be used to understand the 
dynamics of fact vs. fiction dissemination in social media platforms. I also show that 
the situations where gossip has the strongest influence function are not necessarily the 
same situations where it has the strongest information function. For example, gossip 
has the strongest information function when people interact infrequently but has the 
strongest influence function when people interact frequently. This may be able to 
explain the puzzle why sometimes a community can have many gossipers while the 
gossipers are not bringing incremental information. In general, my thesis has raised 
many testable hypotheses that is worth studying in future research. 
4.6 Limitations 
I note that my thesis has some limitations. First, though I try to make the 
strategy set unbiased toward either cooperators or defectors and unbiased toward 
either gossipers or non-gossipers, the strategies are still not exhaustive. For example, 
I assume that two exploitive agents (i.e., CDs) will cooperate with each other based 
on the assumption that when people believe their partners are shrewd, they will tend 
to mutually cooperate instead of perishing together. However, I aware that other 
possibilities exist, and it is implausible to include all of them. Nevertheless, my 
strategy set has already covered more strategies than previous models (e.g., Nowak & 





Another asymmetricity in the strategies is that, in my model, while reverse-
hypocritical agents (i.e., GDs) pretend to be unconditional defectors (i.e., ADs) in 
front of gossipers, hypocritical agents (GCs) pretend to be virtuous cooperators (i.e., 
CC) instead of unconditional cooperators (i.e., AC). I made this choice because in the 
pilot study, I found that if hypocritical agents pretend to be unconditional cooperators, 
they will be exploited by exploitive agents (i.e., CDs) and thus be disadvantageous in 
the evolution. This indicates that hypocritical individuals not only want to appear 
“nice” in gossip, but also want to send a signal that they are not easy to be exploited. 
Although this assumption is reasonable, this has made the strategies asymmetric. One 
way to overcome this is to implement different versions of hypocritical agents, 
including those who pretend to be ACs, CCs, CDs, etc., as well as different versions 
of reverse-hypocritical agents. However, that will expand the strategy set dramatically 
and make the results hard to interpret. Nevertheless, the goal of the current model is 
not to create an exhaustive strategy set that covers all the possibilities of human 
behaviors. Instead, I only want to identify one of the possible mechanisms for the 
evolution of gossipers based on several justifiable assumptions. Future empirical and 
modeling studies can examine the heterogeneity among gossiper sensitive individuals 
and explore the evolution of different versions of hypocritical and reverse-
hypocritical individuals. 
 In addition, in this thesis, I assume that once an agent has updated their 
strategy, they will be treated as a brand-new person. This resembles the death-birth 
process in evolution, in which strategy updating happens when an individual dies and 





strategy in the middle of their lifetime and their old and new reputations may be 
mixed in people’s minds as well as in gossip. The current model does not consider 
such situation, and this may be examined in future studies.  
Moreover, like all the other agent-based models, I extracted only a few 
procedures from the decision-making processes related to cooperation and gossiping. 
The way that human beings utilize reputation information and react to gossipers 
should be much more complicated than captured in the current model. There are also 
many other factors that influence the results. For example, in additions to the 
information and influence functions, gossiping is also entertaining and can facilitate 
friendship (Foster, 2004; Shaw et al., 2011). These functions of gossip may also 
contribute to the evolution of gossipers and cooperation. Nevertheless, the current 
model can serve as a starting point for models of increasing complexity and realism. 
It can also be extended to examine the evolution of various other behaviors under the 
same framework. 
4.7 Future Directions 
There are many ways to extend the current model. First, future studies can 
examine the evolution of different gossiping strategies. In the current model, there are 
only unconditional gossipers who gossip indiscriminatively and unconditional non-
gossipers. Future models can implement conditional gossipers whose gossiping 
decisions depend on the listeners’ reputations or the relationship between the 
gossipers and the listeners. This will be helpful to understand how people form their 
“communities” of gossip and how information heterogeneity may emerge as a result 





deciding the content of gossip. In the current study, agents randomly choose their 
gossip targets, and they always gossip honestly. However, people may prefer to 
spread positive or negative gossip (Grosser et al., 2010), may exaggerate or downplay 
their confidence, and may intentionally spread inaccurate information for different 
reasons (Peters & Fonseca, 2020). Future studies can examine the evolution of these 
behaviors as well as their impacts on information accuracy and cooperation. 
From the gossip perceivers’ perspective, future studies can also manipulate 
how people process reputation information. For example, people may be more 
influenced by negative gossip than positive gossip (Ito et al., 1998). People may be 
more likely to trust the gossip from someone they have cooperated with. People may 
have different assumptions of others’ strategies when there is no preexisting 
knowledge available (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2013). Moreover, when hearing a piece of 
gossip that is different from their prior belief, people may have different levels of 
resistance and openness (Kruglanski et al., 1993). The current model framework can 
be modified to incorporate these factors and examine a variety of questions on gossip 
and cooperation. 
 Future studies can also incorporate some other mechanisms to the current 
framework and examine their impacts on cooperation. For example, punishment and 
gossip are the two well-studied mechanisms in cooperation, which are often 
compared against each other (Wu et al., 2016). Kniffin and Wilson (2010) argued that 
gossip is a substitute for formal punishment when the cost of punishment is too high. 
Future work can incorporate both gossip and punishment in the same model and 





reputation, there are two ways that people can treat them—to ostracize them or to also 
defect with them (Giardini et al., 2014). Future studies may also examine the different 
roles of gossip in these two situations.  
 Finally, one of the mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation is group 
selection—though a cooperator might not do better than their fellow defectors in the 
same population, a group of cooperators may be more successful than a group of 
defectors (Nowak, 2006). The same mechanism may explain the evolution of 
gossipers as well. Future research can implement a multi-level selection model and 
examine its impact on the evolution of gossipers and cooperation. 
 To conclude, this thesis has not only built an agent-based model to examine 
the functions of gossip and the evolution of gossipers, but also designed an 
extendable framework that can be used to study a variety of questions on cooperation 
and gossip in general. Combined with validations from empirical data, my model can 







Model Set-Up: Network Structure 
Figure S1 shows an example of the small world network used in the default 
model. The network has 200 nodes. The average degree of the network, swK = 20. 
The small-world network is generalized with the algorithm in Watts and Strogatz 
(1998) using the “watts_strogatz_grah(n = 200, k = 20, p = 0.5)” function in 
NetworkX in Python.  
 







Step 1: Effects of Gossiping Cost  
 Figure S2 shows the evolution of gossipers when gossiping is costly in Step 1. 
Each condition is got from 30 simulations. In all the conditions, agents talk frequently 
(talkF = 10), but only gossipers gossip. Results show that even if a little cost is 
implemented to gossiping behavior (e.g., gCost = 0.01, which is 1% of the cost of 
cooperation), it will cause the proportion of gossipers to dramatically decrease. This 
result shows that the set-up in Step 1 is not sufficient to explain the prevalence of 
gossipers in human evolution. 
 








Step 2: Effects of Gossiping Cost 
Figure S3 shows the evolution of gossipers when gossiping is costly in Step 2. 
Each condition is got from 30 simulations. In all the conditions, agents are allowed to 
talk (talkF = 10) and gossiper sensitive agents (i.e., GCs and GDs) are allowed to 
manage their reputation in gossip. Results show that a substantial proportion of 
gossipers evolve even when gossiping is relatively costly (e.g., gCost = 0.05, which is 
5% of the cost of cooperation). These results show that the evolution of gossipers is 
resistant to moderate cost if both the information and influence functions of gossip 
are enabled. 
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